

THE MENACE FROM THE RIGHT

A great many **Jews** in Palestine and their supporters in this country are being led into a trap.

This trap is of a **two-fold** nature. On the one hand, the impasse in Jewish nationalist politics — evidenced by stoppage of immigration, restrictions on land purchase, colonization, and economic development — has led in Palestine to a suicidal terrorism as the activist alternative to submission to the British. On the other hand, this growth of terrorism, besides worsening the political situation **vis-à-vis** Britain, is being used to spearhead the attack by the Right upon the **Jewish** working class.

We propose to show that:

1. Jewish statists, whether moderates or **pro-terrorist** in relation to England, are leading Palestine Jews towards civil wars **within** the Jewish population, and with the Arabs. Any such wars would be irrelevant to the well-being of the mass of Jews and Arabs, and among the Jews would serve eventually to crush the Jewish working class.

2. Conservatives in Palestine, strongly backed by top leaders of American Zionist organizations, are using the popular opposition to the British, diverted into terrorist channels, to build a political machine aimed at destroying the strength of Jewish workers.

3. Though aiming to influence Britain by a show of force, the terrorists follow the main course of Jewish nationalist politics, namely: trying to win a grant of some sort of Jewish national sovereignty from one of the Big Powers. This is both a source of strength and of weakness for the terrorists. It wins them supporters in the short run, for they can appear as militant and logical nationalists, which they are. But the impasse of Zionism today is the impasse of nationalist politics, and so the terrorists are merely pursuing more energetically a policy in relation to England that is doomed to failure.

4. Jewish-Arab cooperation, on a working-class level, is an immediate, workable alternative to resignation to the British, to terrorist self-annihilation, or to the self-deception of **salvation** by Russia. This activity by-passes the nationalist Zionist impasse, by resting for its achievement on the efforts of the workers themselves. Vigorous work in this direction would effectively **strengthen** the Jewish workers in Palestine, in relation both to the British and to the Jewish upper classes. The various nationalist schemes for **Palestine** are having just the opposite effects.

RIGHTISTS DOMINATE WORLD CONGRESS

The growing strength of the rightist parties is revealed by the representation of delegates to the forthcoming World Zionist Congress. About 58 per cent of the 317 delegates from all countries and parties represent the extreme rightist groups and their conservative supporters. Most important is the rise of the extreme rightist Revisionists in Palestine to the second largest party in the elections there.

Results Of Elections To The World Zionist Congress

PARTIES	PALESTINE		UNITED STATES		ALL COUNTRIES
	Votes	Delegates	Votes	Delegates	Total
Mapai	68,939	28	45,886	29	86
Revisionists	26,964	11	7,860	6	26
Hashomer Hatzair...	23,991	10	—	—	17
Ahdut Avoda — Left Poale Zion ...	24,049	10	—	—	25
Aliyah Hadasha ...	12,055	5	—	—	6
General Zionist	7,616	3	109,086	68	106
Mizrachi	5,238	2	27,925	18	51
Hapoel Mizrachi ...	19,176	8	—	—	
Others*	28,161	2	—	—	—
TOTAL	196,189	79	190,757	121	317

*Includes a number of small groups most of whom allocated their delegate rights to larger parties.

Sources of data:

Palestine votes and delegates: *Mishmar*, November 11, 1946
United States, number of votes: *New Palestine*, August 8, 1946

United States delegates: Jewish Agency office, New York
World totals: *Canadian Zionist*, November 1946

As between the United States and Palestine, which together account for two-thirds of the delegates, there is a marked **discrepancy** in the number of votes cast and the delegates representing them. Each Palestine delegate represents 2475 votes cast and counted, while of the American delegates each represents about 1500

votes. This seems especially odd in view of the fact that the constitution of the World Zionist Organization provides that each Palestine Shekel (voting certificate) should have twice the representation, in terms of delegates, as Shekels outside of Palestine.

However, while proportionate representation of parties within the delegations from each country depends on the proportion of votes it receives in the polling, the absolute number of delegates allotted to each country to be apportioned among the several parties depends not on the number of votes cast but upon the number of Shekels sold. Here is the key to the apparently reversed magnitudes of representation noted above between Palestine and the United States. In the United States over 900,000 Shekels were sold at half a dollar. (A representative of the Shekel Board in New York indicated that data on the sales of Shekels in the United States would not be released until after the Congress was held.)

In effect this system makes the number of delegates from each country largely dependent on the aggregate money power of the people there. Thus many Zionists here were reported to have purchased great blocks of Shekels. Whole synagogue memberships were enrolled as Shekel purchasers without them

even knowing of it. It would seem that the credentials of the American delegates at the Congress could be challenged on the grounds that there is no evidence as to how many of the Shekel sales were bona fide.

The main result of this arrangement is to give the parties of the Right, who scored far better in the United States than in Palestine, substantial delegations to the Congress. On all matters where divisions are likely to form along class lines it means that the money power of the American conservatives will make it possible for them to join the Palestine Right in out-voting any possible coalition of labor parties. It means powerful support to the avowedly terrorist and anti-working class Revisionist party. On the issue of dealing with the British to effect a territorial partitioning of Palestine, the Palestine pro-partitionists are apparently in the minority within the Palestine delegations. Among the heavy delegations from outside of Palestine, especially from the United States, could probably be found sufficient numbers of pro-partitionists to make possible an aggregate majority to vote for a deal on partition arranged by the Jewish Agency executive. In that event we may note that the money power of the Americans made it possible for them to legislate the constitutional status of the Jews in Palestine.

THE LINE UP OF PARTIES

Since 1939, when the last World Congress was held, there have been a series of shifts and realignments, among the various parties. The social democratic party, **Mapai**, which has long carried a majority in the Labor Federation and a plurality in the Zionist Congresses, suffered a split in 1944. A substantial minority disagreed with the majority leadership, regarding it as too conservative in general political and trade union matters. This minority, calling itself "Unity of Labor" (**Ahdut Avoda**), has recently joined forces with the Left **Poale Zion** to form the **Ahdut Avoda-Poale Zion Party**. This party has favored the **Biltmore (Jewish State) Program**, but stresses a "Jewish socialist state" in Palestine. It is divided on the issue of terrorism as a political weapon. At the same time, the party favors Jewish-Arab worker cooperation.

Mapai, the principal social democratic party, is staunchly in favor of a Jewish state as an immediate political goal. Though its composition is largely working and lower middle classes, **Mapai** is strongly nationalist and collaborates in political coalitions with bourgeois groups. **Mapai** personnel are placed in the key executive positions of the great network of economic and social organizations operated by the **Histadrut** and Jewish Agency. Their influence pervades every area of Jewish Palestine. The party is divided on the issue of the use of terrorism as a political weapon*, and was once divided on partition, when the top leadership of the party threw its full weight behind the 1937 British partition proposal. It has op-

posed consistently the class-based plan of Jewish-Arab lower class political cooperation, while at the same time organizing an Arab trade union associated with the **Histadrut**.

Hashomer Hatzair, the main left opposition party to **Mapai**, was formerly a federation of communal settlements with some political allies among city workers. During the past year it has formally taken on the character of a political party. It opposes the programs for a Jewish state and the partition plans and proposes a bi-national, Jewish-Arab state, as a way to insure Palestine as an area for future mass immigration. The party published a detailed memorandum at the time of the **Anglo-American** Inquiry Commission hearings, explaining its views on the establishment of a bi-national state, based on Jewish-Arab political parity, and underscoring the importance of Jewish-Arab labor cooperation within that framework. **Hashomer Hatzair** publishes a Hebrew daily with an Arabic supplement. The party is in emphatic opposition to the political use of terrorism.

In Palestine, **Mapai**, **Hashomer Hatzair** and **Ahdut Avoda-Poale Zion** have presented separate slates of delegates for the Congress elections. In the United States, the latter two parties joined in a coalition with the American branch of **Mapai** (known here as **Poale Zion**). The fusion of these groups with **Poale Zion** in the United States elections to the Zionist Congress led to the virtual cessation of public debate here on the major political issues.

*The differentiation of policy on terrorism drawn here is based primarily on the Palestine press. While all parties have denounced individual acts of terrorism, only the completely anti-terrorist parties have denounced the use of terrorism as a political weapon.

General Zionist A (pro-labor middle class), disappeared for the most part, at the last Congress when the American General Zionists joined with the anti-

labor rightists after anti-labor leaders captured the American organization. At the forthcoming Congress it is likely that the role of pro-labor liberals will be played by the group known in Palestine as Aliyah Hadasha (New Immigration). This party is composed primarily of middle class western Europeans who are carrying the tradition of liberal German, Austrian and Czech General Zionists who supported labor and the **Weizmann** administration at the various past **Congresses**. The majority in the **Aliya** Hadasha group is known to oppose the programs for a Jewish state and a large group favors political cooperation with **Hashomer Hatzair**. The party has no past record on the **partition** issue but the majority is **likely** to oppose such a development for they are in strong opposition to the use of terrorism as a political weapon.

During the past year, the former General Zionist A and B groups in Palestine have united upon the initiative of American General Zionists. It is to be expected that these groups will together maintain the conservative businessman policies of General Zionist B. In addition, there will be the comparatively large American General Zionist **delegations** to the next Congress (Zionist Organization of America and Hadassah) who will also be in the position of General **Zionist B**. This estimate is based on their record at the last **Congress**, plus their activities since then which included **taking** an active part in **reintroducing** the Revisionists into the WZO. The General Zionist B groups strongly support the Jewish state schemes, and in the past some of them favored **partition**. Palestine businessmen are **now** tending to oppose terrorist activities evidently because of the grave economic disruptions resulting from **British** reprisal measures. **But** the Americans have not opposed all terrorism as a political weapon.

Mizrachi, the clerical party, includes many working people but is controlled by middle class reactionary extremists. They favor the program for a Jewish state, adding their emphasis on having an official state religion. They may oppose partition like other rightist **groups** as a way of blaming labor for political defeats. They have not opposed the use of terrorism as a political weapon.

The Revisionists, largely composed of middle class elements and oriental Jews, are fanatic devotees of ultra-nationalist Jewish **statism**, and implement the terrorist program through such groups as the **Irgun Zvai Leumi**, reputed to have about 6,000 members. (**Hagana**, the "**official**" Jewish military defense organization, with about 80,000 members, has always been pre-

dominantly composed of people from the labor parties although conservative Zionists have been among its leaders.) Revisionists have been against partition in the past (but not opposed to the British Empire), stressing a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan. They are violently opposed to Jewish-Arab **cooperation** as being counter to Jewish nationalist ideals, and denounce the Arabs along racist lines.

On the issue of control of the **WZO**, the division among parties is squarely along class lines. The upper class group (General Zionists B) and the rightist middle class parties (Revisionists and Mizrachi) oppose labor control. Aligned against them are the working class parties (**Mapai**, **Ahdut Avoda-Poale Zion**, Hashomer Hatzair) and the liberal middle class (Aliya Hadasha).

A somewhat **different** division appears on the issue of big power orientation. Only the Hashomer Hatzair and Ahdut Avoda-Poale Zion parties are staunchly pro-Russian. All the others are largely pro-Anglo-American.

In correlating issues with parties we note that while nationalism appears to be a pervasive feature among all parties, particular party policies vary within nationalist boundaries according to occupational composition, and that only the avowedly socialist worker parties favor measures which are part of the lower **class-based** Jewish-Arab worker cooperation plan. The nationalist politics of the middle class and social democratic labor parties require collaboration with and effective subordination to the requirements of the conservative business class. The extent to which the worker parties favor the non-nationalist Jewish-Arab worker cooperation plans brings them into political conflict with the Jewish upper class.

We now turn to a discussion of the major political issues facing the Jews in Palestine in their relations to the British Empire and to the Arab population. In each case we shall try to show the class function of the specific policies **pursued**.

In the largest sense the alternatives for Zionists today are between nationalist and non-nationalist plans. Included in the nationalist schemes are the Jewish Statist alternatives of territorial partition and terrorism as a major political weapon; and the **bi-nationalism** based on a nationalist **compromise**. The non-nationalist alternative is based upon Jewish-Arab worker cooperation. Other issues are the choice of big power allegiance: **Anglo-American**, Russian, or none at all; and the control of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency.

JEWISHSTATISM

The Jews as a Big Power Ally

Since the end of World War II, the partitioning of the world into great-power spheres of influence has **focused** attention on various border **zones**—in one of which Palestine is located. The proponents of the **Biltmore Program**, hoping to gain advantage from this situation, have shifted their emphasis from an independent Jewish state to a Jewish state as **a** loyal ally

of the British. This is an old idea. For a long time, a small section of government opinion in both England and the United States has viewed a Jewish settlement in Palestine as a way to guarantee the strength of Western influence in the Near East. In 1934, Augur, the **New York Times** diplomatic correspondent in England (who frequently reflected British Foreign Office views) wrote that it is "in the British interest that the Holy Land should form a well-knit and prosperous ter-

ritorial unit. For the Air Force **needs** a strongly organized and well-protected base. The progress of Jewish **colonization** in Palestine and the prosperity which accompanies it are, therefore, a British interest. . . . Palestine has become a center from which aerial routes are patrolled and expeditions sent out in support of the British influences all the way from Egypt to India. With Gibraltar **and** Malta, Palestine constitutes the chain of air stations in the basin of the Mediterranean" (April 29, 1945).

However, these circles assumed a strictly limited **Jewish** development — a "strong" community of about 500,000. That would be enough to man modern factories and supply civilian personnel for military installations, and also **create** a militia of about 50,000. This is exactly what happened in Palestine during World War I

A more recent version of the idea of a big power support is the notion that not England but Russia can become a strategic ally of Palestine Jews.

Jewish groups in Palestine appear to be orienting themselves towards one or the other of these **contending** power blocs. Each group visualizes the Jewish State allied to the power bloc it prefers, valiantly supporting it in the event of another world war. At present, neither power has offered an autonomous Jewish state in return for such a loyal alliance. Nevertheless, a tremendous amount of time, energy and funds have been devoted to efforts to achieve such alliances. Political developments may yet make it expedient at some future time for the **Anglo-Americans** to set up a Jewish puppet state.

Dangers in Another World War

A Jewish state subservient to one of the world power-blocs would face two consequences in the event of another world war. First, the dangers faced by any tiny pawn in a big game: being on the losing side in a situation it cannot materially **alter**, sacrifice by its own team in the interests of **over-all** strategy, **powerlessness** to protect itself from annihilation. Secondly, the effects of a war upon a Jewish population divided in its allegiance. The second might be more tragic. Each **major** power would enlist its supporters, long before the war began, in espionage and counter-espionage leading to a disastrous civil war. The kind of infiltration that could be utilized in this way is already in process, taking the form of competing British and Russian "cultural centers" and the like.

It would **appear** that a populace going quietly about its business, formally disinterested in respect to either of the major power-blocs, would have a far greater chance of survival.

Effect on Jewish Immigration

What would be the effect of such grand alliances on Jewish immigration? No great power has materially **supported large-scale** Jewish immigration to Palestine. Limited **immigration** was favored by the British **when** it suited their larger strategic purposes. The American government has proposed Jewish immigration as a solution to its displaced persons problem in

Europe, and also for internal political reasons. American policy on **Palestine**, however, cannot be expected to differ basically from British policy because the military strategic role of Palestine in relation to the USSR is of equal importance to both powers.

There is no evidence as to what the Russians would do were they the controlling power in Palestine. To date, the Russian attitude towards Jewish immigration to Palestine has derived from the same considerations that motivated their other shifts in **policy**—**namely** the requirements of the Soviet ruling group. Those in Palestine who favor the Russian bloc, assume that the Russian rulers will support an expanding Jewish community in Palestine. Behind this assumption is the **belief** that Russia, regardless of its defects, is essentially a socialist state and therefore likely to come to the aid of the socialist workers of Palestine. The evidence from Russian policy in every other part of the world has been **just** the converse: **pro-Russian** sentiment among workers in other countries has been used to support Russian policy, not the interests of the workers **involved**.*

We should take into account the possibility, however remote it appears at present, of an understanding between Russia and a part of the Palestine Jewish bourgeoisie. Even if the Russians would promise the business men more than could the British, this would mean nothing since industrialist expansion is effectively controlled by British supervision over machinery and raw material imports, and the Russians themselves have no machinery and the like for export. Thus the Russians could not materially aid the basic economic problems involved in assimilation of new immigrants.

Effect on Jewish-Arab Relations

What is the effect of Jewish **statism** on the long-time relations of Jews and Arabs? The movement of Jewish immigration to Palestine in modern times arose from the intolerable position of the Jews in the Diaspora, — a social minority vulnerable to oppression because of its occupational and general political position. Concentration in the middle class trades meant particular sensitivity to economic depression, and the possibility of being readily displaced without unduly disrupting **productional** activities. These disabilities have been removed in Palestine where the Jews occupy the whole range of employments in a modern economy.

Politically, the weakness of the Jewish situation has often derived from their position as agents of a ruling class in relation to an underlying population. In Roman **Egypt**, when the Egyptians rose against their Roman masters, the first to feel the blows of this revolt

*For example, in China, in 1926, the Communists flipped in and out of the **Kuomintang**, stirred up and called off abortive **uprisings** at the signal of the Comintern, based on internal Russian **considerations**—**unrelated** to improving the position of Chinese workers and peasantry: in **pre-Hitler Germany** the Communists directed their main assault not at the Nazis but at the **social-democrats** (whom they termed "**social fascists**") because **Russia's** leaders had to show their own workers that the Russian state apparatus was "really" and radically socialist while it liquidated socialists and the social gains of workers **at home**. For detailed analysis see Arthur **Rosenberg's** "**History of Bolshevism**."

were the Jews who served *as* intermediary agents of the Romans. When the Ukrainians revolted against Polish rule, in the 17th century, the Jews were the first to feel the onslaught of the oppressed populace. There too, the Jews were in the position of representatives (tax collectors and the like) of the Polish barons. In general history texts these events are recorded primarily as revolts of liberation. In Jewish history they are the fearful pogroms of Alexandria and of **Chmelnitzki**.

Such considerations must loom large in the analysis of the current schemes for Jewish statehood, which are based on Great Britain (or some other power) granting political rights to the Jewish community which would then be established in Palestine by Jews and England. The Jews in Palestine would be placed in the position of agents of an imperial power, the first targets of the eventual revolts against imperial rule by

the Arab populace. They would be reestablishing a situation analogous (though on a larger scale) to that which they came to Palestine to eradicate. The Alexandria and **Chmelnitzki** pogroms could be repeated once again.

It is important to note the close **similarity** between the reasoning of the **pro-Anglo-American** and the pro-Russian sides among the Zionists. Both assume a partial coincidence of interest between imperial ruling powers and themselves, and to both of them, this forms the basis for a program of persuasion via the press, cultural delegations and diplomatic negotiations. All are designed to impress upon the representatives of the respective great power that the Jews in Palestine can be devoted local allies. One serious outcome of this reasoning has been the concentration of political endeavors along these lines to the virtual neglect of organized attempts to work with the Arab population.

PARTITION

The failure of the maximalist Jewish **statism** of the **Biltmore** Program has led an important group of Zionist leaders to come out for a Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine, in as large an area as the British would grant. This is the "**last** line of defense" of those Jewish nationalist leaders who are irrevocably committed to the methods of formal diplomacy and legal posturing prescribed for national spokesmen in western society. They have always expected the British to reciprocate the services rendered to the empire by Palestine Jews. They have never understood that "gratitude is not a coin in international politics". Having lost their battles of memoranda and commission reports, they see little left to do but be humble and accept what is offered.

Any grant of a partitioned state offered to the Jews could hardly be anything but a toy state, economically absurd in relation to future Jewish immigration needs. It would be satisfactory only to those legalist nationalists to whom the appearance of Jewish flag and delegates to the UN are crucial objectives. The partitionists, many of them dazzled by the trappings of sovereignty, are oblivious to the fact that any British offer would necessarily be framed to serve the same empire policy requirements now being implemented by other means. Such a state could serve the British admirably to foment conflict between Jews and **Arabs**.

However, the political leaders who would **favor** a partition scheme cannot see this as a particular disadvantage. Their long-time policy has been to refrain from political dealings with any Arabs except through the **British**—as a result of which there have been practically no dealings. Says **Chaim Weizmann**: "I have always believed that the British people are the natural intermediaries between us and the Arabs, but they have not so far undertaken the task."

The strength of partition among Zionists today derives from the inability of the anti-partitionists, thinking within a nationalist framework, to suggest any alternative.

In 1937, a large number of liberal and labor Zionist leaders strongly favored the partition scheme offered by the Chamberlain government. The new federation scheme of the Attlee government, offering a smaller area than in 1937, and with less autonomy for the Jews, is so much worse for the Jews that Zionist leaders have been prevented by the temper of Palestine Jews from accepting it. But **rejection** of this plan will not leave the Jewish Agency leaders with any working alternative. Faced with a showdown, the **Agency** sees no remaining court of appeal, no new **ail** to whom it can turn as against the British. The policy of the Agency enables it to fight the British Empire only from within; it does not enable it completely to reject the empire.

TERRORISM

For the last year and a half, there has been going on among the Palestine Jews a debate **largely unreported** in the Palestine press, for most of the participants must shield their views for their own protection. Terrorism, as a political weapon (**so-called "activism"**), is the topic. Terrorism is proposed to force the British to make political concessions to the Jews, either immediate, unlimited immigration and a "reasonably" partitioned Palestine, or even the grant of the Jewish state in all of Palestine. An ideology favoring terrorism has

long been part of extreme right-wing Jewish statist's political apparatus, particularly the Revisionists, the long-time consistent proponents of ultra-nationalist anti-working class goals and strong arm methods. What is new in the current situation is that apparently a substantial part of the Jewish population is passively supporting some sort of terrorist program. Anti-terrorists too favor the use of force where necessary to facilitate immigration and colonization. But the **pro-terrorists** view military force as a primary political tool to

needle the British and to obtain **large** concessions. **Pro-terrorist**, in our formulation, does not necessarily mean agreement with the particular acts carried out by the organized terrorist groups (**Irgun Zvai Leumi** and Stern) but rather, support of military attacks upon the British for political ends.

How can the increased support for terrorism be explained? The continued implementation of the White Paper of 1939 after the end of the war made obvious the British intention of preventing further large scale immigration. It became obvious to increasing numbers of Palestine Jews that the traditional methods of **diplomacy** would not bring **large-scale Jewish** immigration, possibilities for land purchase, or other necessities **denied** the Jewish community for its expansion. To the constant frustration felt by Palestine Jews as their relatives rotted in reconverted concentration camps, must be added the direct acts of provocation by the British: **anti-semitic** speeches by British politicians and military **leaders**; attempted incitement of Arab riots against Jews by British police officials; searches of Jewish settlements for arms; mass arrests, appropriation of the Jewish Agency's complete files, attempts to **break** the Jewish Defense Organization (**Haganah**) and hints at dissolution of the Jewish Agency.

In view of all this, what can one do, say the **pro-terrorists**, but stand up to the British and make the best possible fight. One view is that such a fight may yield a more favorable **partition**. And if, in the extreme view, terror fails to result in the grant of a full Jewish state then there is nothing to lose. The effort would in any case serve as a glorious episode in the history of the Jewish nation fighting for its honor.

This argument is suicidal, since obviously the Jews can win nothing in a fight against Britain; on the contrary each terrorist act provides Britain with a basis for the further implementation of its own long-range plan for stopping the expansion of the Jewish community, and perhaps even of weakening it considerably.

The assumption that "the Jews" like "the Arabs" can get concessions from the British by violence must be examined. In the first place, the Arabs, as a national group, have not been standing in opposition to British rule. Arab **nationalist** demands have been controlled by upper class leaders primarily interested in winning for themselves concessions from the British in the form of greater personal political authority in their countries. And the British have been amenable to such demands because these same Arab politicians serve as the principal supports of social stability and British influence in their respective countries. As payment for these services, the rulers of Saudi Arabia, **Transjordan**, and Iraq have Britain to thank for their thrones; they are directly dependent upon British (or **Anglo-American**) financial and military support for the **maintenance** of their sovereignty. The Egyptian government, for all its nationalist talk, refrains from anti-British action because the economy is closely dependent - on British purchases and supplies, and the British owe Egypt more than 400 million pounds sterling granted in war credits. These economic ties represent potent political levers.

The Arab rulers are in the position of very junior partners in the British imperial firm. Their clamor for concessions is simply a demand for a greater share of status and income. Contrast the results of British "concessions" to the Arab rulers, superficial political shifts, with the wide social changes that would be induced in the Middle East as a result of rapid modernization **in** Palestine. A large modern, industrial economy manned by a literate and sophisticated working and middle class, could not be expected to bear colonial rule for long. Here, then, is why the British reaction to their disgruntled junior partners, the Arab leaders, is very different from their reaction to the Zionists, whose plans, if fulfilled, would lead to results ultimately **subversive** of imperial rule.

The immediate point, however, is that anti-British attacks are not a practical or successful way to fight for the security of Jews in Palestine, or for further immigration. Militarily, the British are able to hit back **incomparably** harder than the Jews can. Frontal attacks or guerilla campaigns against the powerful British forces stationed **in** Palestine could only result in immense losses in lives and wholesale destruction of towns and colonies, the fruits of painstaking labor. Nor would any of this sacrifice be relevant to aiding **immigration**. On the contrary, it would mean a vast diversion of energies and resources in a hopeless pursuit.

All this does not mean that there is no way of fighting the British, and generally the imperial, control in Palestine. But the effective means is by economic **non-cooperation**, and by Jewish-Arab cooperation, making it clear that neither the British nor any other power can rely on the cooperation and subservience of the bulk of Palestine Jews and Arabs in the event of war.

To the Arab people the spread of terrorism could **only** be a signal that the Jewish population is becoming increasingly nationalistic, that it is discarding the anti-terrorist policies which prevailed in 1936-39, when the overwhelming bulk of Jews refused to enter in an anti-Arab retaliation against the attacking Arab **bands**. It would mean to the Arabs that the ultra-nationalist policies of fascist Revisionists, known for their anti-Arab racism, were being taken up by many others.

Within the Jewish community, the spread of terrorism as a political policy means the expanded influence of the extreme rightist parties, for they are the pioneers in this field and only they will follow the program consistently. Jewish labor is already paying a heavy price, for numbers of Palestine youth have been led to align themselves with the extreme nationalists. Many of the incoming younger immigrants have grown up in the wolf-like existence of war-time Europe, and have little or no experience as productive workers. Given large **followings**, which they have never had to date, the extreme nationalists would indeed be in a position to **fulfill** their old dream of breaking the General Jewish Federation of Labor.

Differently from the **Irgun**, the smaller Stern group of terrorists not only urges terror as a political weapon, but has also begun to declare itself "socialist and **anti-**

perialist", and to invite the support of the USSR. The political division of labor among the terrorists follows a similar differentiation as between the conservative and "left" wings of the major fascist movements.

For all their denunciation of the British, the terrorists are not in general anti-British, do not want expulsion of the British. Like the moderate statist, **they** too want to make a deal with Britain. The terrorists differ from moderates in relying on armed attacks as a device for extracting the best possible **bargain**.

From a political point of view the terrorists are in **fact** assisting the British. Their activity helps keep the population in a turmoil and is an important addition to the persistent British provocations toward Jewish-Arab war. Furthermore, the terrorists, by launching a fight against anti-terrorist **Jews**, do a useful thing for the British who are particularly distrustful of the organized Jewish collective farmers and urban workers. The bulk of the terrorists are essentially **pro-British** in their big power orientation, while the **Hashomer Hatzair** Party, Achdut Avoda-Left **Poale Zion**, and part of **Aliyah Hadasha** are not only anti-terrorist, but have also been **pro-Russian**. So the **Irgun Zvai Leumi**, by attacking these groups among the anti-terrorists, aids the British campaign against **pro-Russian** parties in the Middle East.

So **influential** have the terrorists become in Palestine that they are described as "controlling the **street**"—meaning that a great part of the populace looks to them for leadership and is ready to protect them.

If this trend continues it means a fundamental change in the whole character of Jewish Palestine. Until now the General Jewish Federation of Labor (**Histadrut**) has been the overwhelming prestige group in the community. The workers as an organized class group set the tone not only in many economic and directly political matters, but also in literature and the arts, with the result that the workers have had a **tremendous** morale as a class that showed up proudly in

all aspects of living. Unlike their fellows in other lands, the workers did not display that obsequious subservience toward employers, or the bourgeoisie generally, which is customary in capitalist societies. To new immigrants, the **Histadrut** was the obvious organization to be connected with, because it could provide so many services through its widely flung cooperatives. All this may change markedly with the continued growth of the fascist party under the cloak of anti-British terror.

Terrorism has become the Trojan Horse of the Right in its struggle against workers as a class.

American General Zionist leaders have been able to have an increasing part in Palestine's internal affairs as a result of the political demise of European influence and European Jewish communities, and as a result of the growing volume of investments by American Jews. To date their intervention has been largely **unpublicized**. They threw their weight on the side of the conservatives and **extreme-rightists** without bothering to get specific mandates from their American membership for such actions. In the past a great many members of the General Zionist Organizations have voted for the labor slate in elections to the World Zionist Congress. Today, these leaders are forced to mislead their membership and falsify the character of the **Irgun Zvai Leumi** in order to rally popular support to the fascist terrorists.

Here is the main clue to the cause of perennial complaints by American Zionists concerning the lack of information on the detailed political doings of top leaders given even to the second and third level leaders. Both withholding of news and misinformation have been customary practices.

One result of these activities has been in effect to transfer a sector of the Palestine class **struggle** to the United States. Resistance to the anti-working class **manoeuvres** of top leaders would undoubtedly increase if many American Zionists knew what the leaders were doing.

CONTROL OF WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

In our discussion of the dangers of nationalist politics to the Palestine Jewish workers we referred to the **rowing** strength of the Jewish fascist Revisionists, based on their leading role in terrorist activities. As the traditional spearhead of anti-labor politics the Revisionists have generally been supported by the businessman conservatives. During the last months, however, Palestinian **businessmen** have vigorously **opposed** the use of terrorism as a political weapon, thus appearing to oppose the Revisionists. But this opposition is only partial, because the increasingly important part of the Palestine Jewish bourgeoisie, Jewish investors residing in the United States, have been **forcefully** backing both the long-time anti-labor and terrorist policies of the Revisionists and other Palestine rightists.

Why the difference? The crucial fact here is that

for the Palestine Jewish businessmen their main fluid investments are threatened by the spread of terrorism and military activities. So they are forced to oppose **terrorism**. But the American Zionists investing in Palestine bear no such burdens. Only a fractional part of their resources, if any, are invested in Palestine and so they need not fear dire effects from temporary **disruptions** caused by military operations. The American Palestine investors are therefore able to take a long-view on marshalling anti-labor forces in Palestine and have been throwing their support unreservedly to the extreme rightists. In Palestine too, the representatives of the bourgeoisie (e.g. the mayors of Jewish towns) actively and openly support Revisionist anti-labor **policies**.

The net result has been a large increment of support to the Revisionists. Assistance from American Gen-

eral Zionist leaders has undoubtedly played an important role. At the recent convention of the Zionist Organization of America, there were boasts of \$100,000 in American funds to aid the Palestine Jewish rightist parties.

All this is evidence of a growing and determined effort by the conservatives to unseat the labor parties from their hitherto dominant role in controlling the affairs of the Jewish Agency.

In the internal affairs of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) the nationalist point of view has rested on the proposition that the common interest binding the various parties and classes together, immigration, colonization, land purchase and the like, overshadowed by far the areas of disagreement. For a long time there prevailed in the WZO a kind of working agreement in which the labor groups came to have the dominant administrative role. This was commensurate with the overwhelming importance of the General Jewish Federation of Labor in the various Palestine colonization projects and with the strength of Jewish labor vis-à-vis the business class.

With the evident breakdown of nationalist politics as a guide to practical achievement, the parties of the right seized the opportunity to demand the ouster of the Weizmann administration in the WZO. The Zionist administration, (headed by liberal, General Zionist, Chaim Weizmann) has until now been substantially in the control of the social democratic Labor Party (Mapai) which also controls the General Jewish Federation of Labor. The rightist nationalists hold that Mapai represents only one class in the population, while they represent the "general, national interests of the Jewish people". They demand greater "national unity", meaning acquiescence by labor to lower wages, etc., in the interest of the prosperity of the "national" industry. The growing conflict for control of the WZO is thus seen to derive from the conflict of classes in Palestine itself, with the non-Palestine parties (importantly, the American General Zionists) taking sides on this issue with their Palestine class fellows.

In preparation for the forthcoming World Zionist

Congress the parties of the right have been actively negotiating various coalitions evidently designed to finish off the labor administration of the Jewish Agency once and for all. Strongly assisted especially by the leaders of the Zionist Organization of America, (but also by the Mapai), the Revisionists, forced out of the WZO in 1935, have returned to participate officially in the elections for the next Congress.

For many years now there have been no political center groups in the WZO. The so-called General Zionists have been divided between group A (pro-labor) and group B (anti-labor). They operated as distinct and often opposing parties. In recent months these two groups in Palestine have been re-united under the banner of group B, following negotiations initiated by leaders of the Zionist Organization of America.

Within Palestine, the parties of the right have during the past years displayed increasing aggressiveness. After refusing to participate in the 1945 elections for the Palestine Jewish Community Council, evidently hesitant to show the small size of their following, these same groups demanded and obtained a substantial number of seats on the Community Council. This situation was made possible by the Mapai party, which dominates the Council, because it could obtain a majority only by allying itself either with the right or with the various left opposition laborite groups. The Mapai chose the former course, partly because its leaders favor class collaboration ("national unity") politics and are strongly Jewish statist

When the anti-labor Revisionists announced their return to the WZO, approval was expressed in the Hegeh, the afternoon edition of Davar (Mapai controlled newspaper of the Jewish Labor Federation). This editorial (February 2, 1946) said in part: "... (return of the Revisionists) is a positive step both in respect of its effect on world opinion and as a move towards greater. . . . During the past months, Mapai has hardly offered any resistance to the assault on its position. Indeed, what can they say? They are in basic political agreement with the General Zionists and even with the ultra-right Revisionists in the desire for a Jewish state.

NATIONALIST BINATIONALISM

In opposition to the statist proposals — either for a large or a partitioned Jewish state, or for the use of terrorism as a political weapon — is the plan for a bi-national state in Palestine as an immediate goal, set up under British or United Nations auspices. To binationalists, either a Jewish or an Arab state is undesirable, for a way must be found to satisfy the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs, without either group dominating the other. The binationalists oppose territorial exclusiveness for the Jews in Palestine. Thus while rejecting the goal of Jewish statehood in a whole or partitioned Palestine, they advocate a formalized, non-territorial division, a partition of power between the Jews and Arabs, as national groups. Detailed plans to achieve this goal have been advanced by the Hashomer Hatzair left-wing labor party*

and by Judah Magnes' Ihud (Union Association)**.

These plans envision a gradual change from the present regime. The British Mandate is to be replaced by a United Nations trusteeship which itself will be the basis for transition to an independent Palestine, preferably as part of a federation of Near East states. While the present Mandate continues in force, the British should, according to the Ihud plan, establish an

*"Case for a Bi-National Palestine". Memorandum prepared by Hashomer Hatzair Workers Party of Palestine, March, 1946.

**Statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, by Ihud (Union Association) of Palestine, 1946.

Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of Jews and Arabs, with a purely consultative role. **Further**, the British Administration should begin to place properly qualified Jews and Arabs in executive government posts. Under the trusteeship, there is to be a **democratically** elected legislature, as part of a government whose constitution is to be drawn up in consultation with Jews and Arabs, **subject** to the final decision of a United Nations body.

Political parity as suggested by Hashomer **Hatzair** would mean autonomy for each nation in its cultural affairs, and perhaps equal representation in a future law-making body regardless of which nation comprises the numerical majority. It is hoped that the present fears of Jewish (or Arab) numerical preponderance would be put aside by Arab (and Jewish) nationalists in return for strict guarantees of full autonomy in **many** Arab affairs, thus opening the way for Arab acceptance of mass Jewish **immigration** within the economic capacities of the country. Unlike **Ihud**, Hashomer **Hatzair's** plan assumes that a way must be found to assure free entry into Palestine for future mass immigration even from the Anglo-American countries. Cooperation of Jewish and Arab workers would be an important part of this plan once it is put into effect.

While concern for unlimited Jewish Immigration is a major feature of the political parity plan, the **Ihud** group proposes numerical parity of Jews and Arabs, thus **limiting** immigration to the number necessary to equate the two groups. **Non-domination**, they allege, could be assured only by safeguarding literal numerical equality.

An essential part of both plans for a **bi-national** state is equalization of the Arab and Jewish standards of living. This could be achieved by a long-range economic development and modernization scheme, including the Jordan Valley Authority and the like.

In emphasizing numerical parity between Jews and Arabs as the key to **feasibility** of a bi-national government, **bi-nationalists** assume that the principal issues will be decided along strictly national lines. Yet in

modern industrial societies (such as Palestine is rapidly becoming) where the business of government is increasingly concerned with **socio-economic** matters, division is more often along **occupational-class** lines than nationality lines. Furthermore, the idea that equal state power will be guaranteed by population equality, **mis-**understands the character of industrial society, where the capacity of the **productional** technology **rather** than numerical weight is the greater determinant of power.

Implicit **in** these **blue-prints** is the assumption that there is a possible coincidence of interests which will permit the **British—and** the other **major** United Nations **—to** plan the affairs of Palestine in a way which would advance well-being and amity of the local populations. Some features of these plans could be carried out only if Palestine were removed from the arena of Big Three rivalries. It is not indicated how the desired development could take place now that the area has become a principal British military base. Nor is it apparent why, barring drastic changes in the character and needs of empire, the British would undertake to foster Jewish-Arab amity and intensive economic development in Palestine. To date they have acted vigorously to block both.

Also implicit in these plans is the notion that the Arab leaders, acting presumably as agents of the Arab nation, would be willing and able to come to terms along the lines indicated with their opposite numbers among the Jews. Disregarded is the role of Arab leaders as junior partners in the British Empire, a role which offers them incomparably more prestige and authority in their society than could any **alliance** with the Jews to set up a democratic state.

Arab politicians represent the Arab **landholding** elements and the new Arab business class. In a modernized Arab society, the **landholding** families, now feudal lords and religious leaders, would have much less importance. And the Arab businessmen compete with their Jewish opposites. Because of these conflicting interests of national leaders, there is little likelihood of a compromise between them.

JEWISH-ARAB WORKER COOPERATION

By analyzing the situation of **Jews**, in class rather than in national categories the very real dilemmas of nationalism (in effect of the upper classes) are by-passed. That is because we now find that the nationalist programs do not exhaust the range of political action for Jewish workers. Quite the contrary. By showing that the nationalist plans are all that is possible for the upper class **only** we are able to open the question of Jewish-Arab cooperation for serious discussion.

A program of cooperation of Jewish and Arab workers has much to offer for the long range security of the Jews in Palestine and for immediate visa-less **immigration**. It provides a way for organizing the most effective opposition to colonial rule and for blocking the colonial technique of "divide and rule". For the mass

of Jews it offers, above all, a workable alternative to the main nationalist choices: war against Britain or partition. These alternatives are avoided by putting the problems of political understanding and action in terms of **class** rather than **nation**.

While disregard of British empire laws, and some degree of sabotage would be part of dogged continuation of visa-less immigration, much of the effect desired from the nationalist schemes that lead to anti-British attacks as a **major** policy instrument can be achieved by actions that are part of the program of Jewish-Arab worker **cooperation**.

At the same time, its practicability *is* evidenced by such developments as joint **Arab-Jewish** strike actions in defiance of nationalist preachment, expression by

Arab villagers of sympathy and solidarity with Jewish colonies that have been attacked by the British, and the refusal of the masses of Arabs to be led into anti-Jewish riots despite the most direct provocation by British-paid gangsters offering **arms**, leadership and immunity to arrest*. A basis for **activities** to knit Jewish and **Arab** workers in a common economic and political program exists in the various industrial and governmental establishments where they are **employed** together.

A very interesting case in point is the country-wide strike of 50,000 government employees (22% Jews, 78% Arabs) which in April, 1946, halted all public communications, closed many government departments over a **two-week** period, and resulted in substantial **gains** by the strikers. (See detailed account in *Bulletin*, May and August, 1946.) The strike began rather spontaneously and was featured throughout by complete agreement and close cooperation in all matters **between** Arabs and Jews.

There had been Jewish-Arab worker cooperation on a **large** scale before: the 1931 general strike of Jewish and Arab drivers, the **sit-down** strike in the Haifa railroad **workshops**, the strike in the Army workshops in early 1946 when Jewish and Arab workers demonstrated together on the streets of Tel-Aviv. But never before was the cooperation **as** extensive as in this strike: joint demonstrations in the four major cities, with Hebrew and Arabic **slogans**; speeches in Arab and Jewish clubs read in both languages; and above all, the slogan "long live unity."

Extreme nationalists, both Jewish and Arab, denounced the strike as harmful to the cause. **Jamal Husseini**, chairman of the Arab **Higher** Committee, declared (*Ad Difa*, April 19, 1946) that he "is fully sympathetic with the Arab clerks, but because of certain considerations does not want the Supreme Arab Council to intervene".

In the Jewish press, none dared object openly to Jewish-Arab cooperation, for the great bulk of the Jewish population manifestly supported the strikers. But in the rightist Jewish **press**** the strike was declared to be "solely in the interest of the Arabs".

Among the sympathizers with the workers' **economic** demands there were those (e.g. the liberal Jewish middle class party **Aliyah** Hadasha) who regarded the strike merely as a trade union action, and of no political significance; it was negative, against the government, rather than for something. To the *Palestine Post* (April 18), spokesman for the Jewish Agency, the strike was a "non-political issue". This estimate, however, ignored the fact that Jewish-Arab worker **cooperation** was successful in an atmosphere loaded with nationalist hate **propaganda**—for a boycott of "Zionist goods" on the Arab side, and against "foreign" (Arab) labor among the Jews. In this light, the strike was a blow against nationalist politics, both Jewish and Arab.

*See Palestine **dispatches** by **Constantine Poulos** to *Overseas News Agency*, especially November 9, 1945.

***Yediot. Achronot, Hatzofeh (Mizrachi); Haboker* (General Zionist B).

Neither Jewish nor Arab workers heeded the nationalist pleas. As *Al Itichad* (Arab **pro-Communist** paper) put it: "Who told **Falastin** that the Arabs do not want an agreement with the Jews?" Said **Mishmar** (Hashomer **Hatzair** daily): "The strike is a strong expression of the solidarity and community of interests of the Jewish worker and his Arab fellow worker" (April 11).

Among Jewish and Arab workers, nationalist ideologies have been forced to give way somewhat to pressures deriving from the **occupational-class** position. In defense of their **job** interests, even nationalist workers are led to act in ways **which**, regardless of their **awareness** of this fact, **ontradiect** nationalist political requirements. The program of Jewish-Arab worker cooperation would seek to convert the readiness to behave pragmatically on job issues into a general political program relevant to the **workers'** class position.

The possibilities of such cooperation are limited by the great economic and cultural barriers between Jews and Arabs, and by the political barriers which have been erected on both sides. But the possibilities are furthered by the rapid industrialization of Arabs: many thousands of them are now unionized; but the **Hista-drut**, which was first on the scene, lost them to nationalist **upper-class** Arab leaders because it itself was bound by a nationalist Jewish outlook.

Once enough Jewish workers decide to push **cooperation** with Arab **workers**, very many ways could be found to accelerate this work. Most important of course would be the direct activity of Jewish workers among their Arab fellows toward joint union and related activities.

For example, the recent report* of the committee of American economists on Palestine suggested that "decided economic advantages to both communities could be derived from the employment of Arab labor, side by side with Jewish, on Jewish construction." We can detail some of these advantages. For Jewish labor it would mean avoiding a boom in housing jobs followed by a possible crash. Additions of Arabs to the labor force could speed sorely needed housing which would directly benefit Jewish workers caught in the pinch of speculative rentals. Paying the prevailing wage rates of the Jewish economic sector to Arab workers thus employed would have the effect of increasing their standard of living and would constitute a powerful pressure toward a general equalizing of wage rates for Jewish and Arab workers. The long standing differences in wage scales for similar work between the Jewish and Arab economies have been gradually lessening. But the existing differentials are very important barriers to many types of **economic** and social relations. Unskilled Arab building-trades workers today are paid an average of .500 pounds sterling per day **compared** with 1.350 pounds sterling among comparable Jewish workers (*Palestine Economist*, July, 1946). The Arab workers involved would gain materially from such employment and could thereby be introduced to membership in the General Jewish Federation of Labor.

***Robert Nathan**, Oscar Gass, Daniel Creamer "*Palestine, Problem and Promise*", American Council on Public Affairs, 1946, p. 572.

Carrying out such programs would, of course, mean dropping the "Jewish labor only" policy which has in effect been important not so much as a guarantor of jobs to new immigrants (many Arabs have always been employed by Jews) but as an endless source of clashes, irritation and distrust between Jewish and Arab workers. In Palestine, critics of "Jewish labor only" have suggested "organized labor" as an alternative keynote for relations with Arab workers.

The possibility of economic measures such as those indicated certainly is not likely to yield overnight results in terms of Jewish and Arab political agreement. Even given strategically designed economic measures, there are still large barriers to the organization of Jewish-Arab worker cooperation in the existing cultural and political differences. More important than the differences in language are the contrasts between patterns of living: the Jewish workers, products of European urban centers; Arab workers, mostly recruited recently from relatively primitive agrarian surroundings. These cultural differences have been utilized by nationalist jinnoes, Jewish and Arab, to teach the doctrine of inevitable national conflict. National exclusiveness has been turned to political account by the upper class dominated movements among both peoples to mobilize the populace to battle for nationalist programs, ostensibly designed for the "people as a whole", actually serving the particular upper classes in their conflicts with each other and against "their own" workers. Jewish and Arab businessmen have organized campaigns to "Buy Jewish" or "Buy Arab" with appropriate newspaper buildup and the like, effectively to manipulate popular support for campaigns designed primarily to protect their profits. We have never heard of any agreements with the British government in which the Jewish Agency and the principal Arab politicians each undertook to refrain from activities that could result in political cooperation of the mass of Jews and Arabs. But the record of events reads as if there actually were such agreements. It will not be an easy task to overcome the suspicions and hates born of the developments that made the Jewish Revisionists and the Grand Mufti into national heroes.

But while we indicate the role of the upper classes in these matters there is no gainsaying the effect of organized Jewish worker activities in maintaining and strengthening Jewish-Arab separation. The great majority of Jewish workers, acting through the General Jewish Federation of Labor, shares responsibility with the two upper classes. The Labor Federation has Jim-Crowded Arab workers, organized "Jewish labor only" campaigns, participated in the "Buy Jewish" drives. Its Arab Department, staffed with ardent nationalists, has organized some 2500 Arab workers in a union that is separate from but affiliated with the Labor Federation. But political discussion is forbidden on the theory that there is no ground for discussion.

A group of young Arab workers were present at the 1946 May Day mass meeting organized by the Haifa section of the Labor Federation. Scant attention was given them. All the addresses, placards and singing at the meeting were in Hebrew. The Jewish national anthem "Hatikvah" (The Hope) was played at the close of the formal proceedings. There was no apparent recognition of the presence of the Arab workers, except

that the indoor celebrations which followed the open-air gathering were arranged so that the Arab workers were segregated in a separate hall (Naivel, May 10, 1946). There can be no doubt as to the general difficulties in dealing with people from a different culture, but the development of culturally relativist attitudes toward Arabs appears to be a necessary matter on which little has been done. Jewish-Arab relations are viewed as a tragic conflict of two nations, and many Jews speak of Arabs in a manner reminiscent of American "white supremacy" Southerner talk about Negroes. One major result of these preconceptions has been the alienation of Arab workers convincing them that there must be something to the arguments offered by "their own 'nationalist' leaders".

Despite such difficulties in implementation, the political program based on Jewish-Arab worker cooperation has enormous practical advantages for the Jewish workers over the nationalist schemes. Most important is the fact that this is an immediate program, the work it requires can be begun by Jewish workers whenever they so decide. It does not depend, as do the nationalist schemes, on Big Power approval. Neither does it involve suicidal battles of annihilation with the British Army, organized under the cloak of cheap, not to mention, unrealistic slogans like "Palestine is another Ireland". The territorial nationalists demand immediate results, but they hide the truth of the Irish tale—a century of bitter struggle by the Irish who were the dominant people in their country and could fight the British with far greater resources than Palestine's Jews can marshal.

Neither does this Jewish-Arab program depend on Jewish upper class approval, or even participation of the whole Jewish working class. It is action that can be taken now by any sufficiently large number of Jewish workers, but precisely only if they are prepared to do it themselves—as organized bodies of workers, without any formal requirements of first winning over the various Jewish institutions or achieving "Jewish unity" including upper class approval.

Joint action of Jewish and Arab workers would be a major threat to British and Arab upper class politics in the entire Middle East. The British have based their political control system on the Arab League—essentially, a series of deals with Arab upper classes. Jewish-Arab cooperation would deflate the Arab nationalist fervor that rests heavily on countering the "Jewish danger in Palestine". In so doing it would menace the politics both of the British and of the Arab upper classes.

If the Jewish workers were to concentrate now on Jewish-Arab cooperation instead of supporting the bargaining for a toy state, they would have a job no more difficult than the one they are now engaged in, far less costly, far more relevant to basic security in the long run and by strengthening Jewish workers vis-a-vis England, to immigration in the short run, far more effective towards an ultimate expulsion of the British and any other empires; and lastly, an activity which, unlike nationalist activism, cannot be led by the business classes, since Jewish-Arab cooperation can succeed only on a working class level and with anti-status-quo, egalitarian, aims.